Baum, 1995

The central tenet that defines radical behaviorism is the idea that there is no such thing as agency, or stated positively, that behavior consists of ordinary natural events. Radical behaviorism denies the distinction, common in English speakers, that seperates actions from natural events. Although and event's category cannot be determined from label alone (e.g. "John fell"), its status is indicated by the presence or absence of surrounding mentalistic usage (e.g. "on purpose"). The linguist Benjamin Whorf called such categories cryptotypes are so poorly suited to science that scientists must talk "in what amounts to a new language". Radical behaviorists do this when they seek to include behavioral events in the cryptotype of natural events. In doing so, they omit the conventional notion of an individual self or doer and treat behavioral events as "just happening." Instead of explaining the events as "done," behaviorists see as occuring in a nexus of many other events both earlier and later. Although Skinner referred to this nexus as "history," no special status attaches to the past, present or future. The explanatory strategy resembles Rachlin's application of Aristotle's explanations by final cause. All of these root tenents of radical behaviorism - rejection of agency, the illusory nature of the individualself, behavioral events just happen, and happen in a broad nexus of other events - correspond to key tenents of Eastern mysticism. The unacceptability of behaviorism and mysticism to Westerners may arise from the same incompatibilities with standard English cryptotypes. Apart from differences in terms, when it comes to public stance, there is an affinity between behaviorists and New Age writers, who promote assimilation of Eastern mysticism into Western culture. In the public view, however, the New Age is unrespectable but nice, whereas behaviorism is respectable but not nice. The two might be blended into an account which is both respectable and nice.