Hi All!
Important notes:
#1: The following post does not attempt to ask/answer any fundamental questions of existence or non-existence and should not be interpreted as such. This post pertains to a contemplative strategy (conditioning procedure) that may likely be useful as an antecedent intervention in affecting qualities/properties of elicited responses in desirable/beneficial/functional ways.
#2: I made this post in an attempt to be helpful to the (ACT/ACBS) community but I understand that, under current conditions, it may not be the best time for some to read and consider these topics. Please consider your current state before committing to reading a post discussing deep philosophical issues related to notions of “self”… please consider the possibility that it might be better for you to wait for another time to read/contemplate these topics.
#3: For more information on contemplative strategies as (likely) useful antecedent interventions (from an RFT perspective), please read “On the utility of contemplative practices…” that can be found among my blog posts on this (ACBS) website.
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Suppose a small child was to come to have an enemy who, one day, decides to make a doll in the likeness of this child and, upon showing the child the creation, proclaim “This is You!” before proceeding to stomp aggressively on that doll.
If this small child, in noticing the striking physical similarities between him/herself and the doll, were to conclude “That doll is me!”, then that child might likely experience that stomping in great pain/suffering thinking “It’s me/my “self” that’s being stomped on!” And if that enemy were to then pick the doll up, mention he/she has worse plans in mind, and take the doll away, the child might very well suffer in great fear/worry in imagining all the awful things his enemy could possibly be subjecting him/her to. And this cycle would be likely to continue, and strong aversive responding would likely maintain in that child, so long as the belief/conviction “I am that doll”/”That doll is me/”That doll is self” persists/maintains.
If, then, that child’s parents, or teacher, upon seeing this child in great distress, were to inform that child that the doll is NOT in fact him/her “self” (assuming the child believes them over the enemy), then this might likely come to have a significant effect on elicited responding in the present/future presence of that doll (i.e., either physical or symbolic contact with that stimulus)… Though, even with this information, elicited aversive responding may still likely continue to be evoked at some magnitude for some time in the presence of that doll (depending on the level of conditioning), but, over time and with the mindful recollection that “That doll is not me/I/self” every time the doll is perceived as a stimulus, elicited responding would be likely to decrease to levels much less likely to be considered “aversive” (if felt at all).
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In my (current) view, strong elicited feelings such “fear” and “worry” elicited by strong desires to avoid/escape some future (highly) aversive stimulus condition/consequence (e.g., getting sick from a virus) can be best categorized as reflexive conditioned motivating operations (a “type” of MO) because the stimulus (e.g., virus) has gained aversive properties (fear/worry) through its association with “worsening conditions”. As MOs, they are stimuli that (momentarily) function to (1) establish escape/avoidance from some consequence as an effective reinforcer and (2) increase the momentary frequency of behaviors more likely than others to produce this desirable outcome.
However, once action evoked by strong fear/worry has been decided (e.g., goal setting) and taken (e.g., plan developed and consistently executed) by an individual towards the perceived threat one strongly desires to avoid/escape, then any strong feelings of fear/worry that remain/develop past this point are actually more likely to have a relatively undesirable function (i.e., they are more likely to be “dysfunctional”) rather than having a desirable function or even just having a neutral function. This, I think, is for two main reasons: (1) relatively strong feelings of fear/worry are typically experienced, in the moment/s they are elicited/experienced, as (strong) aversive events and (2) strong feelings of fear/worry have the likely function of decreasing the momentary probability of values-consistent actions by increasing the probability values-incompatible behaviors often elicited by strong aversive stimulation as functional antecedents (i.e., emotional behaviors; aggression).
Thus, strong aversive feelings of fear/worry likely (1) negatively affect the subjective quality of one’s current/ongoing present moment/s and (2) negatively affect the subjective quality of one’s future present moments by decreasing the probability of the type of actions (i.e., values based) that function for this purpose.
Because strong feeling of fear/worry are likely to be functional in some contexts, it likely would not be prudent (or perhaps even possible) to try to eliminate such behavior from occurring. However, if it can be determined that there is a way to impact functional aspects/properties (e.g., magnitude) of elicited responses in ways that are likely to benefit the subjective quality of one’s current, ongoing, and future present moment/s, then this likely represents a worthwhile venture for those who seek these type of “better outcomes” for self and/or others.
ACT, to my understanding, currently focuses on one’s behavior once these types of elicited responses occur (i.e., as antecedent variables to be acted upon when noticed/present). For example, a client might be instructed to notice these feelings as they arise and then work to defuse from them in the service of maintaining values-consistent action. In utilizing such a strategy, it might be expected that the magnitude of such elicited responses would decrease (a beneficial outcome from the current perspective) over time through some combination of extinction/habituation.
However, strong elicited feelings of fear/worry, as elicited behavior/responding, can themselves be subject to alteration/intervention if/when the variables that produce and maintain these behaviors (as they currently are) are identified and altered in certain strategic/beneficial/functional ways (i.e., one can look at these behaviors in terms of relative desirability/functionality of elicited outcomes [outcome oriented] rather than only as antecedents to be acted upon once elicited).
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To my understanding, in utilizing notions of “self” such as “conceptualized self” and “self-as-context”, ACT theory does not purport, in doing so, to answer the basic questions of existence such as “Is there a self?” or “Do “I” exist?”. ACT theory, as one grounded in “workability”, merely identifies versions of “self” that can be seen as relatively unhelpful/dysfunction (e.g., conceptualized self) and relatively helpful/functional (i.e., self as context) to have/hold onto.
The question then, in ACT, as it pertains to a notion of “self” is not necessarily “Is there a self?” or “Do “I” exist?”, but rather: “When, how, and in what ways can having/holding onto a notion of ‘self’ be helpful/functional?” In such a theory, it is the desirable outcomes produced by following/holding onto a version of “self” that determine/establish that version of “self” as a (relatively) “true”, or “functional”.
Likewise, the question as it pertains to “not self” is not “Is there no self?” or “Do “I” not exist?”, but rather: “When, how, and in what ways can having/holding onto a notion of ‘not self’ be helpful/functional?”
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Thank you for taking the time to read this. I hope you find it useful!
As always, any feedback/dialogue is welcome and appreciated.
Jesse