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A Challenge to the Mentalistic Order: Barriers to the Dissemination of Behavior Analytic Philosophy

APA Citation

Rector, E. (2017, July). A Challenge to the Mentalistic Order: Barriers to the Dissemination of Behavior Analytic Philosophy. Operants (2),17.

Publication Topic
Behavior Analysis: Conceptual
Education: Conceptual
Publication Type
Article
Language
English
Keyword(s)
consciousness, determinism, mentalism, Chomsky, cognitive, political systems
Abstract

This essay examines why radical behaviorism—despite a deep scientific grounding in a deterministic, empirical analysis of behavior—remains marginalized in mainstream psychology and society, while mentalistic explanations of human action continue to dominate. The author traces this to strong cultural investments in the idea of a "free" self, reinforced by religious, legal, and economic institutions that assume individuals are autonomous agents responsible for their own outcomes. Drawing on Jay Moore's account of mentalism, the essay argues that everyday explanations of behavior (e.g., someone acts "lazy" or "driven") are circular descriptions mistaken for causes, rather than genuine explanations rooted in environmental contingencies and reinforcement history. The piece revisits the historical defeat of Skinnerian behaviorism by the "cognitive revolution," contending that Chomsky's critique of Verbal Behavior succeeded less on scientific merit than as an expression of the anti-institutional, individualist zeitgeist of the 1960s. Rather than a genuine paradigm shift, the author frames cognitivism as a "reversion" to older, intuitive notions of a self-directed mind. Comparing radical behaviorism's unintuitive, selectionist logic to that of Darwinian evolution, the essay suggests that behaviorism has yet to achieve comparable public acceptance because it lacks the institutional and educational reinforcement evolution eventually received. It concludes that the marginalization of behaviorism carries significant social consequences: mentalistic thinking underlies systems of criminal justice, economic inequality, and interpersonal judgment that hold individuals morally responsible for behavior actually shaped by environmental contingencies. The author calls for a reexamination of social institutions in light of behavioral science, arguing that genuine accountability lies not in blaming individuals but in redesigning the environmental systems that shape human action.