I told several people that I would post a copy of these slides, so here they are. The slides are missing a lot of the clinical examples we used, and they have supervision examples that we did not use (to conserve time), but for the most part, this was our presentation. I also just wanted to note that Amanda and I did this talk for a specific purpose. We wanted to show how the philosophy of science "plays out" in the contexts of clinical work (including therapy and supervision) and to emphasize that viewing this stuff as science (as opposed to something mystical, magical, etc.) lends itself better to clinical training and dissemination. Hope it is useful! Amy

Workshop Title: The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): Where From, How To, and Where To Workshop Abstract: A key objective of the workshop will be to summarise the key empirical literatures that gave rise to the IRAP, and to then collate the rapidly expanding IRAP literature itself. The authors will draw on this empirical base to outline key principles of how best to design and implement IRAPs so as to both maximise precision and minimise attrition. These principles will be illustrated in practice for workshop participants by the workshop facilitators. The IRAP is a computerised response-time measure derived from an integration of the account of human language and cognition provided by Relational Frame Theory (RFT), and the substantial cognitive literature addressing so-called “implicit” attitudes. In broad terms the model underlying the IRAP conceptualises implicit effects as being driven by immediate and relatively brief relational responses; in contrast, explicit (self-report) measures then are thought to reflect more elaborated and coherent relational response networks for which implicit attitudes are precursors. More simply, the IRAP captures spontaneous and automatic evaluative responses, whereas self-report measures capture more carefully considered deliberative reactions. Whereas explicit measures are frequently criticised as suffering from the limitations of introspection, and as largely reflecting a person’s tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner, implicit measures are relatively impervious to such confounding biases. Indeed, to date numerous studies have shown that the IRAP supplements traditional explicit measures, to provide greater prediction of target behaviours and a more precise understanding of the processes of attitude and behaviour change (see http://psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP_Articles.shtml). Implicit attitudes appear to be particularly useful in the analysis of relatively established behaviours that do not often come under deliberative control such as those underlying addictive compulsions or prejudice. The workshop facilitators will provide workshop participants advice on how best to harness these strengths for the purposes of their individual research interests.

Here are the slides from a brief presentation I gave at World Conference III that discussed 'Prediction and influence with precision, scope and depth'. It's mainly aimed at clinicians and I'm turning it into a paper to help explain the bits that need explaining. Get in touch if you see anything that you'd like to mention. Cheers Joe (joe.curran@shsc.nhs.uk)

Title: Resistance to Anti-smoking Information As a Function of Implicit Expectancies Toward Smoking and Smoking-cessation Presenters/authors and affiliations: Vahey, N.1, Barnes-Holmes, D.1, Barnes-Holmes, Y.1, & Stewart, I.2 1National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland. 2National University of Ireland, Galway, Co. Galway, Ireland. Objectives: To examine across two studies (N = 92), how implicit expectations of quitting versus smoking impede anti-smoking messages prescribing smoking-cessation. Design: The studies employed group comparisons (smokers at different stages of change and nonsmokers), coupled with repeated-measures analyses of target-attitudes about quitting and smoking. Between-group manipulations also allowed the examination of how implicit attitudes interact with the framing of the anti-smoking information presented. Method: The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure required participants to alternate between making “consistent” responses and “inconsistent” responses (e.g. responding “True” and “False” respectively, to “I Need to Smoke when Upset”) at speed. The response-time differentials between consistent and inconsistent tasks indexed implicit bias. Results: ANOVA and regression statistics provided significant effects strongly implicating implicit attitudes in smoking-persistence and –relapse. Conclusions: The collective findings suggest that implicit smoking- and quitting-related expectancies are important in differentially undermining smoking-cessation, by respectively precipitating smoking-relapse and undermining information that prescribes quitting.

This is the powerpoint from a paper presented at Worldcon

Deictic relational responding in beliefs attribution: people with high social anhedonia are impaired in reversing the frame of I-YOU. A Relational Frame account of beliefs attribution has been proposed in terms of deictic relational responding. According to this view, attributing beliefs to another involves a higher relational complexity than self-attributing because it requires reversing the deictic frame of I-YOU (i.e., taking the perspective of another). Social anhedonia has been shown to lack social interactions and to present deficits in attribution of mental states and in complex deictic relational responding involving the frame of I-YOU. The current study investigated the ability to respond in accordance with deictic frames in a task consisting of reporting true- and false-beliefs to another and to the self in 30 participants with a high level of social anhedonia. We predicted that these participants would perform weaker than controls on tasks involving attributing beliefs to another. Consistent with this prediction, participants with high social anhedonia were less accurate than controls when reporting the beliefs of another, but not of the self, thus indicating difficulties in reversing the deictic frame of I-YOU in this population. Implications for the understanding of deficits in beliefs attribution in populations characterized by a high level of social anhedonia (e.g. people with schizophrenia) are discussed.