About Contextualism
About ContextualismIn his 1942 book World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence, philosopher Stephen Pepper noted that philosophical systems tend to cluster around a few distinct "world hypotheses" or "world views." Each world view is characterized by a distinctive underlying root metaphor and truth criterion. Root metaphors are based on seemingly well-understood, common-sense, everyday objects or ideas, and serve as the basic analogy by which an analyst attempts to understand the world. Truth criteria are inextricably linked to their root metaphors, and provide the basis for evaluating the validity of analyses. While the details of Pepper's analysis are open to debate, his framework can prove very useful for revealing the essential components, assumptions, and concerns of different discourse communities. Pepper identifies only four "relatively adequate" world hypotheses, with adequacy determined by the world view’s degree of precision and scope. Precision refers to the number of ways a particular phenomenon can be explained by a world view’s concepts (the fewer, the better), and scope refers to the number of phenomena that can be explained using those concepts (the more, the better). All world hypotheses strive to achieve complete scope with absolute precision, but none fully reach this ideal. These four world views, however, come the closest: formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. The vision of psychology represented on this website is based on contextualism. It is a world view in which any event is interpreted as an ongoing act inseparable from its current and historical context and in which a radically functional approach to truth and meaning is adopted. These two aspects represent contextualism’s root metaphor and truth criterion, respectively. Contextualism has its roots in philosophical pragmatism, and is also closely related to the view known as selectionism. To learn more about contextualism, clink on a link below.
Root Metaphor
Root MetaphorThe root metaphor of contextualism is often called the act-in-context or the historic event (Pepper, 1942, p. 232), and refers to the common-sense way in which we experience and understand any life event. Consider the simple event of brushing your teeth. What is our common-sense understanding of such an event? First, the event consists of a host of related features that all mutually define the event.The root metaphor of contextualism is often called the act-in-context or the historic event (Gifford & Hayes, 1999, p. 289). Of course, we could also analyze the act of "brushing your teeth" as a collection of individual components. But our everyday experience and understanding of the act is one of a complete and whole event, inseparable from its context. Our common-sense understanding of an event also includes a sense of the purpose, meaning, and function of the event, and all of these depend on past events—or the historical context of the present event. For example, you probably brush your teeth because you’ve been told that doing so will prevent tooth decay, or because not doing so has resulted in painful visits to the dentist, or because you are getting ready for a date, or because your mother or father asked you to clean your teeth. Likewise, you may brush your teeth in the bathroom because you’ve found it convenient to do so in the past, and you’ve probably learned that a toothbrush and toothpaste are good equipment to use for this task, and that a circular motion is effective. All of these past events or life experiences, and more, contribute to an everyday understanding of why and how you brush your teeth. This is why context in contextualism refers to both the current and historical context of an act. It seems Pepper was basing his use of the term "context" on Dewey’s notion of context as "the historical situatedness of the meaning and function of behavior" (Morris, 1997, p. 533). Contextualists analyze all phenomena as acts-in-context. Events and their contexts are separated into different parts by contextualists only to achieve some practical purpose. truth criterion of contextualism.
Truth Criterion
Truth CriterionAn analysis based on contextualism’s root metaphor essentially consists of a description of some event or phenomenon and its current and historical context. Such an analysis is evaluated by examining—not surprisingly—the context in which it was generated. In particular, contextualists determine the validity or "truth" of an analysis by looking at the purpose or function of the analysis. If the analysis includes enough features of the context to successfully achieve the goal of the analysis, then it is deemed "true." In other words, for contextualists the truth and meaning of an idea lies in its function or utility, not in how well it is said to mirror reality. The truth criterion of contextualism is thus dubbed successful working, whereby an analysis is said to be true or valid insofar as it leads to effective action, or achievement of some goal.
This notion of truth reveals contextualism’s roots in philosophical pragmatism, a tradition heavily influenced by the work of figures such as Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey. Pragmatists and contextualists are not concerned with the existence of absolute, foundational truths or assumptions about the universe. As James wrote, "the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events" (1907, p. 161).
For the contextualist, ideas are verified by human experiences, with an idea’s "meaning" essentially defined by its practical consequences, and its "truth" by the degree to which those consequences reflect successful action. Contextualism’s extremely functional approach to meaning, with a heavy emphasis placed on the empirical consequences of ideas, reveals the influence of another figure who greatly affected the development of pragmatist thought: Charles Darwin. Pragmatism can be seen as an application of Darwin’s selectionism to epistemology: In pragmatism, ideas are "selected" (to be retained as true or valid) if they lead to successful action, just as in natural selection traits are "selected" (to be retained by the species) if they lead to reproductive success. This influence is not surprising, as Darwinism was just gaining widespread appeal among scholars during the era in which the early pragmatists were cutting their intellectual teeth (Menand, 2001).
Varieties of Contextualism
Varieties of ContextualismAnalytic goals are vitally important to the contextualistic world view. This is because the analytic tools of contextualism—its root metaphor and truth criterion—both hinge on the purpose of the analysis, and neither can be mounted effectively without a clearly specified analytic goal. (Reese, 1993, p. 77).
Likewise, the root metaphor of the "act-in-context" is rendered meaningless in an analysis without an explicit goal because there would be no basis on which to restrict the analysis to a subset of the infinite expanse of the act’s historical and environmental context (Hayes, 1993b). Without a clear analytic goal, the contextualist could analyze the endless context of an act in perpetuity, without ever knowing when the analysis was complete or good enough to be deemed
Contextualists can, and do, adopt different analytic goals, and the many different varieties of contextualism can be distinguished by their goals. Based on their overarching analytic goals, contextualistic theories can be divided into two general categories: descriptive contextualism and functional_contextualism
Descriptive Contextualism | Functional Contextualism | |
Example | Social Constructionism | Behavior Analysis |
Analytic goal |
To understand the complexity and richness of a whole event through an appreciation of its participants and features | To predict and influence events with precision, scope, and depth using empirically-based concepts and rules |
Knowledge constructed | Personal, ephemeral, specific, local, and spatiotemporally restricted (e.g., a historical narrative) | General, abstract, and spatiotemporally unrestricted (e.g., a scientific principle) |
Content and focus | Individual-in-context | Behavior-in-context |
Preferred methods | Qualitative and narrative | Quantitative and experimental |
Disciplinary type | Natural history | Natural science |
Descriptive Contextualism
Descriptive ContextualismDescriptive contextualists seek to understand the complexity and richness of a whole event through a personal and aesthetic appreciation of its participants and features. This approach reveals a strong adherence to the root metaphor of contextualism and can be likened to the enterprise of history, in which stories of the past are constructed in an attempt to understand whole events. The knowledge constructed by the descriptive contextualist is personal, ephemeral, specific, and spatiotemporally restricted (Morris, 1993).Descriptive contextualists seek to understand the complexity and richness of a whole event through a personal and aesthetic appreciation of its participants and features. This approach reveals a strong adherence to the root metaphor of contextualism and can be likened to the enterprise of history, in which stories of the past are constructed in an attempt to understand whole events. The knowledge constructed by the descriptive contextualist is personal, ephemeral, specific, and spatiotemporally restricted (Morris, 1993). Like a historical narrative, it is knowledge that reflects an in-depth personal understanding of a particular event that occurred (or is occurring) at a particular time and place. Most forms of contextualism, including social constructionism, dramaturgy, hermeneutics, and narrative approaches, are instances of descriptive contextualism. Descriptive contextualism is strong in its adherence to contextualism’s root metaphor of the act-in-context, but suffers from several weaknesses. The analytic goals of descriptive contextualists are somewhat ill-defined, and it is difficult to determine when such goals gave been accomplished. This problem is openly acknowledged by many descriptive contextualists (e.g., LeCompte, Millroy, & Preissle, 1992, p. xv). In addition, a personal, holistic appreciation of a specific event and its context may or may not yield any practical knowledge or benefits (Hayes, 1993b).
Functional Contextualism
Functional ContextualismFunctional contextualists seek to predict and influence events using empirically-based concepts and rules (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hayes, 1993b; Gifford & Hayes, 1999). This approach reveals a strong adherence to contextualism’s extremely practical truth criterion and can be likened to the enterprise of science or engineering, in which general rules and principles are used to predict and influence events. Rules or theories that do not contribute to the achievement of one’s practical goals are ignored or rejected. Knowledge constructed by the functional contextualist is general, abstract, and spatiotemporally unrestricted (Morris, 1993). Like a scientific principle, it is knowledge that is likely to be applicable to all (or many) similar such events, regardless of time or place.
In psychology, functional contextualism has been developed explicitly as a philosophy of science (Biglan, 1995; Gifford & Hayes, 1999; Hayes, 1993b). Specifically, it has been offered as the philosophical basis of the field known as <em>behavior analysis</em>. From the perspective of functional contextualism, behavior analysis is a natural science of behavior that seeks "the development of an organized system of empirically-based verbal concepts and rules that allow behavioral phenomena to be predicted and influenced with precision, scope, and depth" (Biglan & Hayes, 1996, pp. 50-51). By studying the current and historical context in which behavior evolves, behavior analysts strive to develop analytic concepts and rules that are useful for predicting and changing psychological events in a variety of settings. These same concepts and rules can also be used to describe and interpret psychological phenomena for which prediction and influence are presently impractical or impossible (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Skinner, 1974).
The behavior-analytic approach to studying psychological events can be described as selectionistic. Essentially, "behavior analysts think of the shaping of behavior as working in just the same way as the evolution of species" (Baum, 1994, p. 64). In biological evolution, contingencies of survival in a given environment select which genetic traits will persist in a species; in behavioral evolution, contingencies of reinforcement in a given context select which class of responses will persist (or be likely to occur) for an individual. Both the evolution of species and the evolution of behavior can be described as selection by consequences (Skinner, 1981), and the same process has also proven useful for interpreting the evolution of cultural practices (Biglan, 1995; Harris, 1979; Skinner, 1981). Indeed, behavior analysts consider human behavior to be "the joint product of (a) the contingencies of survival responsible for the natural selection of the species and (b) the contingencies of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires acquired by its members, including (c) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved social environment [a culture]" (Skinner, 1987, p. 55). Contextualism and selectionism are closely related concepts, with selectionism being the causal mode inherent to contextual philosophy. Selectionism involves an emphasis on the role historical context and consequences play in shaping the form and function of the phenomenon of interest in the current setting—an emphasis that clearly reflects both the root metaphor and truth criterion of contextualism.
Implications of Functional Contextualism's Analytic Goal
Adopting the analytic goal of the prediction and influence of psychological events leads to several important ramifications for a psychological science. In fact, many of the distinctive characteristics of behavior analysis as a contextualistic science developed directly from this overarching goal. Behavior analysts’ rejection of mentalistic and cognitive explanations for behavior, emphasis on functional relations between behavior and environmental events, and preference for experimental research methods can all be linked to the field’s ultimate purpose. It is important to recognize that prediction and influence form a single goal, and functional contextualists thus value analyses that allow both the prediction and influence of psychological events. They seek to identify variables that "predict the event in question and would, if manipulated, affect the probability, incidence, or prevalence of the event" (Biglan, 1995, p. 34). Analyses which only allow the prediction of behavior, or which rely on variables that are not manipulable (at least in principle), are considered inadequate or incomplete.
Much of the research in psychology and education is based on the development of models that describe how hypothetical constructs and mediating cognitive (or neural) mechanisms determine overt behavior (Biglan & Hayes, 1996). These models generally attribute behavioral events to factors such as a person’s cognitive schema, information-processing mechanisms, brain activity, learning style, attitudes, expectations, knowledge constructions, emotions, thoughts, or feelings. Although these models can be quite accurate predictors of psychological events, they are not very helpful to those who also wish to know how to influence or change psychological events. When one type of psychological event is said to cause or explain another, with limited reference to the impact of environmental or historical variables, we are left with little knowledge of how to change or influence either type of psychological event. To change or influence the behavior or psychological events of another person, we must search for manipulable variables in the environment. Why? Because we are part of that other person’s environment. Anything we could possibly do to affect the performance of an individual, such as deliver psychotherapy or education, occurs in the environment of that individual—in the context of his or her behavior (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986).
In addition, the purported "causes" of behavior in cognitive and mentalistic models are themselves psychological events that require explanation. What caused the attitude, for example, and how can we change it? Once again, behavior analysts search for the answers to such questions in the environment, or—more specifically—in an individual’s lifelong history of interacting with his or her environment. Cognition and other internal events are interpreted by appealing to a person’s learning history, rather than assuming they are underlying processes causing and controlling overt behavior. To put this perspective in terms that may seem less controversial, behavior analysts simply believe that people learn how to think, reason, plan, construct meaning, problem-solve, and more through interactions with their natural, social, and cultural environments. Thus, behavior analysts attempt to identify aspects of the manipulable environment that influence the occurrence, incidence, prevalence, or probability of both private and overt psychological events.
The most effective strategy for identifying variables that both predict and influence behavior is controlled experimentation: events in the context of the behavior are manipulated in a systematic manner, and the resulting effects on the behavior’s occurrence are observed (Biglan, 1995; Hayes, 1993b). This orientation allows researchers to isolate which features of the context are functionally related to changes in the psychological event; purely descriptive or correlative research generally does not provide such knowledge. In behavior analysis, these procedures have traditionally involved the intensive study of individual organisms with time-series (or repeated measures) methodology (e.g., Barlow & Hersen, 1984; Sidman, 1960). While functional contextualists favor experimental techniques, they encourage the use of a diverse set of methodologies, provided that value is always measured against pragmatic goals (Biglan & Hayes, 1996). Group designs using between-subject comparisons can be employed effectively for the purposes of functional contextualism, for example, and even correlational or predictive research of the sort described above can provide clues about contextual variables that might impact behavior. Qualitative methodologies also have their uses in functional contextualism, but are not as effective as experimental procedures for testing the influence of environmental variables on behavior or for verifying the general utility of principles.
A Silly Poem About Contextualism and Behaviorism
A Silly Poem About Contextualism and BehaviorismWhy is Contextualism "a-ontological" and Why is Behavior Analysis Contextualistic?
Why is Contextualism "a-ontological" and Why is Behavior Analysis Contextualistic?Dermot Barnes-Holmes's fun PowerPoint (the BA pdf) below describes answers to both of these questions.
For a detailed paper on this general topic you might start with Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A review of Stephen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 97-111. Like most key ACT / RFT / CBS publications it can be downloaded from the publications list on the site but for convenience it is attached below.